Following the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the British Government established an office dedicated to gathering the views of political groups there, below the level of the state. By the end of 1971, the Office of the UK Representative (UKREP) was actively seeking contacts that would allow them to communicate with the Provisional IRA. By looking at the numerous other contacts, conduits and intermediaries that existed (however temporarily) before the 1975 ceasefire, this article illustrates an almost continuous conversation between the Office of the UK Representative (UKREP) and the IRA. It also demonstrates that these contacts were centred around Dáithí Ó Conaill (then Sinn Fein Vice President), and that these contacts, when taken as a whole, can better explain the events which culminated in the 1975 ceasefire.
Introduction
'The Talks at Feakle came out of the blue for us in the British government. Ever since 1969 when the army took over security in Northern Ireland, there had been ad hoc street contacts between the army and paramilitaries on both sides of the divide, and from the time I had taken office in March 1974 I was being advised that, according to community workers, businessmen and journalists, the Provisional IRA were in a mood to move from violence. Nevertheless, I was always sceptical and remained so when in November I was told of some sort of approach being made by the Provisional IRA.' 1 
The above extract from Secretary of State Merlyn Rees's memoir of his time in Northern
Ireland is both strangely evasive and contradictory. Rees does not explain how, if he knew that 'community workers, businessmen and journalists' spoke to the IRA, why a group of protestant clergymen doing apparently the same thing should be so surprising. And while his 1985 book was not consciously misleading, his interpretation of events was very different from the views he noted at the time both in his tape-recorded diary 2 , as well as in sensitive passages held back from publication from this same memoir. 3 Nua demonstrated a side to the Provisionals that was not apparent in the headlines produced by the group's violence. The Ireland it foresaw was socialist, autarkic and decentralised whereProvincial parliaments would ensure the rights of minorities, and thus the protection of the Protestant population of Northern Ireland. 7 While Éire Nua gave no concession to the right of unionists to opt out of a united Irelanddespite their status as a majority within the proposed Ulster parliament (Dáil Uladh), the essence of Éire Nua was still practical and political. It did not, for instance, envisage the need for nihilistic aggression or civil war between 'Orange and Green' in order to establish Irish unity, in this the Provisional IRA always saw their battle -however naïvely -as being with British forces in Ireland alone.
Squaring the Provisionals' political aims, with its violent (and often sectarian) actions in the early 1970s is not simple. Éire Nua was not just a propaganda device designed to allay the moral consciences of Irish republicans in the 1970s, nor was it simply a sop designed to garner support from Irish America. Éire Nua -when taken seriously -also represents the genuine early political aspirations of Provisional Sinn Fein, aspirations that remained separate from the practicalities of the armed campaign. By publishing such a document, the Provisionals were demonstrating that they remained an organisation that would continue to maintain the means through which their goals could be negotiated.
The new Standard Narrative
Whilst it can be readily demonstrated that, even at the height of the violence, both the IRA and the British government contained elements that were willing to talk, a new standard narrative of the peace process has recently emerged that centres on the use of just one key before the rest of the IRA team gave the British little more than an eighteen month quit notice; something the British were not at all prepared for, or likely to succumb to. 41 Despite the acrimonious meeting and lack of negotiating skill by the IRA delegation,
Steele continued his conversations with the men on the flight back to Northern Ireland. 42 Steele it seemed, had developed a functioning relationship with a senior member of the delegation and, although the ceasefire was now rapidly crumbling, in the days after Cheyne Walk, the MI6 officer continued to receive telephone messages from Dáithí Ó Conaill (under the alias of Sebastian Coffey) on the hotline he had established at Laneside. 43 Steele did not step in to resolve the crisis that eventually broke the 1972 ceasefirethe Lenadoon affair -nor could he have stopped the shooting of a further five Catholic civilians (including a 13 year old girl and a priest) by British soldiers a few miles away in Ballymurphy. 44 The hotline between negotiators was ill-equipped to deal with the minutiae of contentious incidents on the ground when the same channels were being used to discuss the broader political problem itself. If the Lenadoon affair was avoidable, and the Conaill at her Donnybrook home in Dublin on several occasions that summer. 45 There, she advertised (falsely) her influence over the British Prime Minister, and later boasted to other friends that 'she had spent two whole nights with the IRA -"My Provisionals" -drawing up a plan to solve the whole mess.' 46 After the ceasefire broke down, the IRA met again with Harold Wilson in a meeting to which Whitelaw was made aware of and had 'demurred'. 47 Council. 51 The surprising exception here proves the point that he had become the essential evangeliser of Éire Nua and the Provisionals' political strategy. would not commit to one unless they had a guarantees regarding their safety from arrest. 55
Steele's reaction was well considered, partly because he did not trust the IRA and partly because it was now plainly stated government policy not to talk to the IRA. He told the group that there could be no deal without a ceasefire first, but then added that the British would 'lower the level of our activity' if the ceasefire were permanent -i.e. more than a fortnight in duration -and that until that point 'the IRA must remain in hiding as otherwise they would be liable to be lifted by us.' 56 In other words, if the IRA were to declare a ceasefire and remain in hiding, they would be allowed to re-emerge in a relatively short Whitelaw demanded Hackett receive a strongly worded rebuff to warn the General off contacts like this for the sake of his future reputation but Whitelaw's officials went beyond the whole truth however when they told Hackett that 'there is no question of using you, or for that matter anybody else, as an intermediary.' 63 In fact, whether it was through Conciliation Ireland, the NILP or even John Hume, the Secretary of State had at this point at least three other channels through which communication could occur.
While good political intelligence regarding the Provisional IRA's thinking was coming to the NIO from these numerous intermediaries, archive evidence suggests that between continued their low-level discussions but talks were in fact undertaken with loyalist groups rather than republicans when Labour returned to office and held under very different auspices than those with the IRA prior to the 1972 ceasefire.
In these meetings Allan and Oatley went to great lengths in their attempts to conciliate with groups of loyalist paramilitaries linked with the Ulster Workers Council. This included senior members of both the UDA and the UVF and took place both before and after the UWC Strike and the atrocities of the bombs in Dublin and Monaghan. They offered advice to the loyalist delegates who opened up to them about their concerns relating to prisoners and community politics in a series of meetings between May and September 1974. 65 From the NIO's perspective, the channelling off of loyalist paramilitaries from the rest of the UWC was partly designed as an attempt to bring these groups into the mainstream of Northern Ireland politics. James Allan recalls being told to 'have a chat up the chimney, so to speak' and that the talks were unstructured 'in many ways the agenda didn't come from [the Northern Ireland Office]. It came from those who were pressing to be seen at Stormont or at Laneside… as far as trying to recall it, we weren't working to a particular agenda, it was much more easy going, we were massaging' Dean Pruitt, has more recently suggested that, in order to end their paramilitary campaigns, terrorists need to be made to believe that; 'they can achieve power by coming in from the cold, that they will be more effective through participation in legitimate politics than by fighting the authorities.' 66 was something that had crawled out of a bog.' Instead, Loughran was given a drink and sat down with James Allan to watch the Six O'clock news. 68 The meeting with Loughran was organised through the mediation of Joe Camplisson, a community worker, and Dr John Burton, an Australian international conflict specialist then at the University of London who wrote about mediation and Northern Ireland in his previous works. 69 These men were also privately arranging meetings between the UVF and the NIO and later the UDA and the IRA. 70 
Conclusion

Channels of communication between the IRA and the British Government in the early
Troubles were numerous and extended far beyond either the Feakle clergy or Brendan Duddy's 'Link'. They were not dependent on whoever had the upper hand (or felt they had)
militarily. In fact, to take a maximalist approach, violence was as much as part of communication as the talks themselves were part of the conflict. The gun battles, the bombs, the arrests and the security patrols were in many ways simply another means by which the Republican movement and the British communicated. 75 Certainly, Britain's political leaders were also important in this respect as while Whitelaw was willing to trust the IRA with direct contact once, Harold Wilson and Merlyn
Rees rarely ruled out direct contact in exchange for even the most temporary of ceasefires.
And while the Irish government steadfastly opposed talks with the Provisionals and urged the British to exclusively support the constitutionalist efforts of the SDLP, 76 both the SDLP and the Irish government had their own secret means of contact with the IRA, (albeit less frequently. 77 Despite their willingness to communicate, contacts with Northern Ireland's paramilitaries whether direct or via the numerous intermediaries rarely, if ever, constituted negotiations; indeed, conversations were abrupt whenever they strayed into this territory.
MI6 were never in fact negotiating fundamental points and neither Steele nor Oatley were ever given the authority to agree to any constitutional change to the status of Northern Ireland, indeed it would have made the talks a farce if they had claimed this kind of power.
Instead, Laneside was attempting to 'mainstream' these organisations, by slowly replacing their violent tactics with peaceful ones all the while avoiding the negotiation of constitutional ends.
Brendan Duddy later described how the IRA had a dichotomous approach to their struggle, explaining that 'this is the department that bombs, and this is the department that talks' 78 a similar approach was being used by the British in some respects. When the IRA approached the wrong people, talks were short and things were boiled down to first principles very quickly. While this does not suggest that Dáithí Ó Conaill (or equally Frank
Steele and Michael Oatley) were malleable individuals (and certainly the papers show the opposite is true) the sheer number of direct and indirect contacts Ó Conaill in particular was at the heart of, along with his antagonistic relationship with Sean MacStíofáin on the Army Council, 79 leads to the conclusion that the British did not fully grasp Ó Conaill's personal ambition to deliver an IRA truce and begin a political process until after Labour's return to power in 1974.
Once the practical concerns of both the IRA and the British were made clear -at Feakle, through Loughran and through Duddy -a pro-truce cohort in both camps arranged a ceasefire that was followed by more prolonged discussions. This prolonged period of discussion, I argue, was the 1975 truce and while this was directly facilitated by Brendan Duddy, his role must be seen as part of a larger narrative, existing over several years and through a wide variety of different intermediaries. From this point of view, the 1975 truce
